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Hilde Eliassen Restad
The War on Terror from Bush to Obama:
On Power and Path Dependency

1. Introduction 
James Madison famously stated in 1793: “War is in fact the true nurse 
of executive aggrandizement.” By this, Madison meant that, when 
confronted with a grave threat to national security, the instinct of a 
state is to concentrate power at the very top. This can lead – and has 
led – to abuse of power. For instance, President Franklin D. Roose-
velt’s signing of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 resulted 
in the forcible internment of Japanese Americans (two thirds of whom 
were U.S. citizens), an episode widely seen as regrettable later, after 
history had removed Americans from the anxiety of war. But by no 
means do we have to look as far back as to World War II. We can note 
Cold War incidents such as the Iran-Contra scandal (1985–87), when 
the Reagan administration took it upon itself to bypass Congress – and 
specific laws – in order to support the controversial Nicaraguan Con-
tras with money acquired by selling arms to Iran.  
 
Indeed, not only the executive branch, but also the US Congress has – 
especially since World War II – tended to react to threats to national 
security by granting broad powers to the Chief Executive. The Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, passed by Congress in 1964 as a result of biased 
intelligence given to Congress by the executive branch, gave President 
Lyndon B. Johnson the authority he had sought to conduct an all-out 
war in South East Asia (Prados 2004). The joint resolution came about 
because Congress had been led to believe that US warships had been 
attacked without cause by North Vietnam in August 1964 – a “fact” 
later proven incorrect (ibid.).  
 
On September 11, 2001, however, there was no uncertainty about the 
facts: the United States had been attacked. On September 14, 2001, 
Congress passed “The Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against Terrorists” (AUMF),1 a joint resolution authorizing the use of 
force against those responsible for the attacks. It granted the president 
the authority to use all “necessary and appropriate force” against those 
who had “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the September 
11th attacks, or who harbored these persons or groups. Throughout his 
two terms of office, George W. Bush argued that the AUMF granted 
him wide and nigh-unlimited powers in fighting the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). His successor, Barack H. Obama, originally cam-
                                                 
1  The other being “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002”. When used in this report, AUMF refers to the 2001 congressional authorization. 
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paigned against such a broad interpretation of presidential war powers, 
but, as we shall see, has since modified his stance. 
 
This NUPI report examines the latest example of executive aggran-
dizement in US history: the recent and ongoing executive efforts asso-
ciated with fighting international terrorism.2 The policy focus of the 
report is on changes to US foreign policy as pertaining to established 
international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. It does not 
deal with changes in domestic law and politics (as seen with the 
PATRIOT Act and the expansion of warrant-less surveillance). The 
specific policies examined are the classification and detention of the 
enemy (classifying the enemy as being an “unlawful enemy combat-
ant,” and detaining individuals in this category at the Guantánamo 
Bay military facility) and the subsequent treatment of the enemy (tor-
ture and “enhanced interrogation techniques”).3 
 
In terms of theory, the focus is on power and path dependency: Is a 
concentration of power in the executive in a time of national crisis re-
versible? Or will the policies have entrenched themselves so that suc-
ceeding administrations will have no choice but to continue them? The 
case of two presidencies – George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama – is 
highly informative in this regard. Candidate Obama was very clear on 
these two issues: the power amassed by the Bush administration 
should be ratcheted back, and the path on which the United States had 
embarked in the “war on terror” was to be redirected, if not reversed, 
because it clearly conflicted with established domestic and interna-
tional law. In contrast, the concentration of executive power (to the 
detriment of the other two branches) had been a clear priority of the 
outgoing George W. Bush administration (Goldsmith 2007). In a time 
of crisis, the Bush administration said, it was vital to give the Chief 
Executive the power he needed to keep America safe. The Bush ad-
ministration then proceeded to pursue policies that were regarded by 
the international community as contravening established international 
law (Council of Europe 2007). In 2008, presidential candidate Obama 
presented clear policy alternatives to the path on which the United 
States then found itself, especially as regards the paramount issues of 
torture and detainees. The United States would not practice torture (a 
label he extended to waterboarding), and the controversial prisons at 
Guantánamo Bay in Cuba were to be closed. Indeed, the two admin-
                                                 
2  It should be borne in mind that this report has been written by a political scientist, not an 
expert in international law.  
3  Because of the ongoing nature of the research topic, a range of literature and sources have 
been used, including primary sources such as official government documents and mem-
oirs from former administration officials, and secondary literature such as investigative 
reporting and scholarly articles. 
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istrations would seem to – prima facie – differ fundamentally in their 
relative commitment to international law as a meaningful restraint on 
national – and executive – power. The United States would continue 
to fight terrorism, Obama said, but the way this would be done was 
not to jeopardize American values. Obama’s message to American 
voters and indeed the world watching the presidential campaign was 
unequivocal: Whereas the Bush administration had privileged security 
over ideals, Obama vowed to recalibrate the balance between the two 
and regain international respect for the manner in which the United 
States fought its battles. 
 
It may indeed have been Obama’s intention to change US policy fun-
damentally in this area. However, this report concludes, he has thus 
far fallen far short of his campaign promises. Although taking an une-
quivocal stance against torture (banning waterboarding), he has not 
managed to close Guantánamo, end military commissions, or solve the 
problem of detainees being held indefinitely. Indeed, as 2011 came to 
an end, President Obama signed into law the National Defense Au-
thorization bill, which makes indefinite detention of terror suspects 
explicitly lawful. The NDAA stands in stark contrast with what Can-
didate Obama had said while campaigning in 2008. Finally – and not 
surprising to students of American history – as Chief Executive, 
Obama seems quite comfortable with the prerogatives inherited from 
his predecessor.   
George W. Bush 2001–2004: Rights-
Free Territory and Rights-Free People 
A study in contrasts, George W. Bush’s rhetorical defense of “free-
dom” and “liberty” in the wake of the  attacks of 9/11 came with a 
“Global War on Terror” (GWOT) that entailed a series of violations of 
international (and US) legal standards: laws against torture, the indefi-
nite detention of alleged terrorists, and subjecting  alleged terrorists to 
inhumane and degrading treatment. Moreover, the Bush administra-
tion set up secret CIA-run prisons abroad that acquired prisoners 
through the unlawful practice of extraordinary rendition (Cutler 2010). 
The authority to do so was found in the AUMF. The administration 
also argued (in contrast to the later Obama administration) that inher-
ent in Article II of the US Constitution (stipulating that the President 
is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces) is the authority of the 
president to conduct the GWOT as he saw fit, without congressional 
constraints. Nor was George W. Bush the first US president to de-
mand and declare sweeping powers in a time of national security cri-
sis. Indeed, this has been the norm rather than the exception (Schle-
singer 1973). 
 
And a time of national crisis it certainly was. A deeply worried and 
rattled Bush administration found itself facing two sharply conflicting 
imperatives in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. According to Jack Gold-
smith, then legal adviser in the Department of Defense and later head 
of the influential Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of 
Justice, the first of these two was fear of another attack. Such fears 
“permeated the administration” and led to the controversial doctrine of 
prevention (termed “preemption” by the Bush administration) (Mur-
phy and Purdum, 2009). Says Goldsmith, 
 
[T]hey were really scared…And they had this extraordinary sense of responsibil-
ity—that they would be responsible for the next attack. They really thought of it 
as having blood on their hands, and that they’d be forgiven once but not twice 
(Murphy and Purdum, 2009: 5).  
 
The doctrine of prevention and the Iraq War will not be discussed in 
this report. Here we focus on the second imperative: the legal re-
strictions on presidential power and presidential war power that had 
been put in place since the Watergate and intelligence scandals of the 
1970s (Restad 2005). “There was enormous legal uncertainty about 
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how far we could go,” according to Goldsmith (quoted in Murphy and 
Purdum, 2009: 5).  
I. “Unlawful Enemy Combatants”: The Geneva Conventions 
vs. GWOT 
Classification of the Enemy 
On February 7, 2002 President George W. Bush determined that 
members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces were to be 
classified as “unlawful enemy combatants” (Fleischer 2002). Such a 
classification entailed that members of these groups would not be af-
forded the protections provided by the Third Geneva Convention to 
prisoners of war (POWs). The Taliban had waived their right to Third 
Geneva Convention POW status because they did not pass the four-
pronged test that forms one of the definitions of a POW in an interna-
tional conflict, the Bush administration concluded (Fleischer 2002; 
Goldsmith 2007: 110). The order, which was crafted by David Ad-
dington, chief of staff to Vice President Cheney and approved by the 
Office of Legal Council (OLC) (Wilkinson 2009), came after a report-
edly intense behind-the-scenes battle between the State Department on 
the one hand, and the Justice Department, the Defense Department, 
and the Office of the Vice President on the other. The Legal Advisor 
of the Department of State, William Howard Taft IV, has argued that 
the analysis underlying the defining criteria as to enemy combatants 
was flawed, and that it did not take into account several other catego-
ries of persons entitled to Third Geneva Convention POW status 
(Murphy and Purdum, 2009). Indeed, the United States had previously 
afforded POW status to non-conventional groups, one prominent ex-
ample being the Viet Cong in Vietnam (Prugh 1975). As Goldsmith 
writes in his The Terror Presidency, whereas one can disagree about 
the merit of the decision, the analysis as such was not new. Rather, the 
Bush administration’s decision was based on the Reagan administra-
tion’s opposition in the 1980s to amendments to the Geneva Conven-
tions, known as Protocol 1, which would include non-uniformed 
fighters who did not follow the laws of war as protected by the Con-
ventions if captured (2007: 112). The Senate never ratified Protocol 1. 
As such, this legal analysis was a continuation of policies from the 
Reagan era, not a new idea in the GWOT.  
 
The political backdrop to this legal decision was that the President – 
and Congress – had decided that the attacks of 9/11 meant that the 
United States found itself at war. The traditional war powers of the 
Chief Executive had thus been triggered, and Bush interpreted these 
powers broadly. He decided to try the enemy of this war in military 
commissions (as per his September 13, 2001 Executive Order), used 
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throughout US history in time of war, and to detain enemy soldiers for 
as long as the conflict lasted so as to prevent them from re-entering 
the battlefield – as the AUMF authorizes.  
 
George Harris, who represented John Walker Lindh (known as the 
“American Taliban”), argues that the Bush administration employed 
three strategic options to deal with suspected terrorists in the early 
years: (1) detain the suspected terrorist in military custody as an “en-
emy combatant,” indefinitely and without judicial review; (2) bring 
charges and try non-citizen suspects in military tribunals;
 
 (3) charge 
the suspect in federal court and treat the suspect as an “unlawful ene-
my combatant” not entitled to the normal protection granted by inter-
national law (Harris 2003, 32). Indeed, the administration’s anti-
terrorism effort seemed to dismiss the criminal justice model of 
fighting terrorism in favor of a war model, emphasizing prevention 
rather than conviction or punishment (Harris 2003). One aspect of this 
approach was to assert executive discretion to detain terrorism sus-
pects without criminal charges, under the President’s war powers. 
 
In deciding to deny those captured in the GWOT the status of POWs, 
Bush might have been maintaining the previous Reagan-era US posi-
tion, but this was a position not shared by many allied countries, most 
of whom had ratified Protocol 1 by 2001 (Goldsmith 2007: 117). Later 
interviews with Bush administration officials also offer a more com-
plex picture of events. Lawrence Wilkerson, top aide and later chief of 
staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, said in 2008 to an investiga-
tive piece by Vanity Fair magazine that he thought that Legal Advisor 
Will Taft and Secretary of State Colin Powell were both convinced 
that “they had managed to get the president’s attention with regard to 
what they thought was the governing document, the Geneva Conven-
tions” and that “I really think it came as a surprise when the February 
memo was put out” – the memo written by Cheney’s Chief of Staff 
David Addington (Murphy and Purdum 2009: 5). Goldsmith writes 
that Taft indeed had argued that whereas POW status should not be 
conferred on the detainees, they should still be afforded the “Common 
Article 3” protections found in the Geneva Conventions, which con-
tains minimal wartime protections originally designated for civil wars 
(2007: 119).   
 
Whatever the internal debate of the Bush administration, the result 
was, in Goldsmith’s words, “a giant hole, a legal hole of minimal pro-
tections, minimal law.”4 
                                                 
4  Whereas Goldsmith agrees with the legal decision not to extend POW status to detainees, 
he did not agree with the total rejection of domestic and international law that accompa-
nied the decision: “To conclude that the Geneva Conventions don’t apply – it doesn’t fol-
low from that, or at least it shouldn’t, that detainees don’t get certain rights and certain 
protections. There are all sorts of very, very good policy reasons why they should have 
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Detention and Trial of the Enemy 
Behind the choice of Guantánamo Bay as the location for detaining 
terror suspects lay a clear strategy. Ever since the United States had 
acquired jurisdictional treaty rights to Guantánamo Bay in 1903, all 
US presidents had taken the position that aliens held there were with-
out either statutory or constitutional habeas corpus rights, since Cuba 
still maintained territorial sovereignty over the island (Cutler 2010: 
65). Thus, the US government felt no obligation to provide traditional 
due process rights to detained prisoners held there. Furthermore, as 
noted above, the Bush administration concluded that, because al-
Qaeda did not observe the rule of law or generally accepted principles 
of the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners 
of war did not apply (ibid: 66). But, whereas Goldsmith agrees with 
the administration’s decision to withhold POW status for captured 
members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban, he argues this should not have 
led to the refusal to assess whether those captured and held at Guantá-
namo were, in fact, to be considered enemy fighters. The Geneva 
Conventions mandates that a “competent tribunal” be set up to assess 
whether individual prisoners receive POW status or not. In 2002, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that detention at 
Guantánamo was illegal, and urged the United States to have the legal 
status of the detainees determined by such a competent tribunal 
(IACHR 2011). The Bush administration refused to do so on the 
grounds that the president had made a “group status determination” 
that provided a “level and degree of attention [that] exceeds the type 
of attention envisaged by the drafters” of Geneva (Taft, cited in Gold-
smith 2007: 118).  
 
In November 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order declaring 
that accused terrorists were to be tried by secret military commissions 
(Elsea 2010: 1).5 This order specified that persons subject to it would 
have no recourse to the US court system to appeal a verdict or obtain 
any other sort of relief. According to John Bellinger III, legal adviser 
to the National Security Council in the Bush administration (and later 
to Secretary of State Colin Powell), “A small group of administration 
lawyers drafted the president’s military order establishing the military 
commissions, but without the knowledge of the rest of the govern-
ment, including the national-security adviser, me, the secretary of 
state, or even the C.I.A. director” (Murphy and Purdum 2009: 4).  
 
In other words, detained prisoners were not to have their status re-
viewed by a competent tribunal, nor to be granted access to the US 
judicial system. Pursuant to the Congress’ AUMF, they could be le-
                                                 
been given a rigorous legal regime whereby we could legitimatize their detention” (Mur-
phy and Purdum 2008: 5; Goldsmith 2007). 
5  Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Federal Register 57833. 
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gally detained at Guantánamo for as long as the conflict lasted. And of 
course, no one knew how long that would be. 
II. “Enhanced Interrogation Methods”: Torture and the  
United States 
On October 7, 2001, US and British forces commenced the aerial 
campaign against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, “host” to al-Qaeda. 
This was followed some weeks later by a ground invasion. The Tali-
ban government fell and al-Qaeda was disrupted, albeit not defeated. 
The Defense Department’s general counsel, Jim Haynes, had author-
ized military intelligence to “take the gloves off” when interrogating 
captured terror suspects (Murphy and Purdum 2009). One of the first 
to receive this treatment was John Walker Lindh, the “American Tali-
ban.”  According to Jesselyn Radack, ethics adviser at the Department 
of Justice, several laws were broken in connection with the treatment 
and detention of Lindh. Radack was called with the specific question 
of whether or not the FBI on the ground could interrogate Lindh with-
out counsel. Because she had been told unambiguously that Lindh’s 
parents had retained counsel for him, Radack answered “no.” He was 
interrogated anyway. “Well, this is an unethical interrogation,” 
Radack stated, “so you should seal it off and use it only for intelli-
gence-gathering purposes or national security, but not for criminal 
prosecution” (Murphy and Purdum 2009: 4). A few weeks later, At-
torney General John Ashcroft held a press conference in which he an-
nounced a complaint being filed against Lindh. Asked whether Lindh 
had been permitted counsel, Ashcroft replied that Lindh had not re-
quested counsel – which was “completely false,” according to Radack. 
In a later press conference, Ashcroft said that Lindh’s rights had been 
scrupulously guarded, a statement not in harmony with the picture that 
had been circulated worldwide, showing Lindh blindfolded, gagged, 
naked, and bound to a board (ibid). 
 
Suspected terrorists were snatched up and disappeared into what jour-
nalist Mark Danner calls the “hidden global internment network” in-
tended for secret detention and interrogation, set up by the Central In-
telligence Agency under authority granted directly by President Bush 
in a memorandum of understanding signed on September 17, 2001 
(Danner 2009). The secret internment network of “black sites” had its 
own air force and its own distinctive “transfer procedures,” which 
were, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) report, “fairly standardised in most cases.”6  
                                                 
6  From the report: “The detainee would be photographed, both clothed and naked prior to 
and again after transfer. A body cavity check (rectal examination) would be carried out 
and some detainees alleged that a suppository (the type and the effect of such supposito-
ries was unknown by the detainees) was also administered at that moment.  
14 Hilde Eliassen Restad 
Knowing, or at least suspecting, that the detainment and treatment of 
suspected terrorists in the GWOT might be illegal, the administration 
in 2002 sought legal safeguards. According to Danner, this was re-
ferred to as a “golden shield” from the Justice Department. This gold-
en shield was the legal rationale embodied in several infamous “tor-
ture memoranda.” One memorandum written by John Yoo, Deputy 
Director of the Office of Legal Council (OCL) and signed by Assis-
tant Attorney General Jay Bybee in August 2002 claimed that for an 
“alternative [interrogation] procedure” to be considered torture, and 
thus illegal, it would have to cause pain of the sort “that would be as-
sociated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ fail-
ure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body func-
tion will likely result” (quoted in Danner 2009: 3; Bybee 2002). Bybee 
and Yoo’s memorandum set out the limits to coercive interrogation by 
US government officials of those captured in the war on terror. The 
“golden shield” would presumably protect CIA officers from prosecu-
tion. The result was to raise the threshold of what constituted “tor-
ture.” Drawing on the August 2002 memo, the March 2003 memoran-
dum written by Yoo concluded that the Fifth and Eighth Amend-
ments7 did “not extend to alien enemy combatants held abroad” and 
that “federal criminal laws of general applicability do not apply to 
properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants, undertaken 
by military personnel in the course of an armed conflict.” The reason-
ing was that such criminal statutes would “conflict with the Constitu-
tion’s grant of the Commander in Chief power solely to the President” 
(Yoo 2003). 
 
Despite the “golden shield,” Director of Central Intelligence George 
Tenet would still bring to the attention of the highest officials of the 
government specific techniques used – “whether they would be 
slapped, pushed, deprived of sleep or subject to simulated drowning” 
– to make sure they were legal (quoted in Danner 2009). According to 
an ABC News report, the briefings of principals were so detailed and 
frequent that “some of the interrogation sessions were almost choreo-
graphed.” At one such meeting, Attorney General Ashcroft reportedly 
asked, “Why are we talking about this in the White House? History 
                                                 
The detainee would be made to wear a diaper and dressed in a tracksuit. Earphones would 
be placed over his ears, through which music would sometimes be played. He would be 
blindfolded with at least a cloth tied around the head and black goggles. In addition, some 
detainees alleged that cotton wool was also taped over their eyes prior to the blindfold and 
goggles being applied….  
The detainee would be shackled by [the] hands and feet and transported to the airport by 
road and loaded onto a plane. He would usually be transported in a reclined sitting posi-
tion with his hands shackled in front. The journey times…ranged from one hour to over 
twenty-four to thirty hours. The detainee was not allowed to go to the toilet and if neces-
sary was obliged to urinate and defecate into the diaper.”  
7  Amendment V: “Provisions concerning prosecution and due process of law” (also double 
jeopardy restriction and private property); Amendment VIII: “Excessive bail or fines; cru-
el and unusual punishment”. 
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will not judge this kindly.” (Danner 2009; Greenburg et al. 2008; Cut-
ler 2010: 66–67) 
 
On December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld signed off on a memo from the De-
fense Department’s legal counsel, Jim Haynes, permitting the use of 
aggressive interrogation techniques at Guantánamo, including stress 
positions, isolation, and sleep deprivation. Rumsfeld wrote on the 
memo, “I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 
hours?” Alberto Mora, General Counsel to the Navy at the time, has 
stated in an interview that he thought the memo Rumsfeld humorously 
commented on must have been a mistake and that once these mistakes 
were pointed out “the authorization would be instantaneously re-
versed” (Murphy and Purdum 2009: 7). Mora had a meeting with the 
author of the memo, Haynes, “in which I indicated that I felt the doc-
ument authorized abusive treatment that included torture.” Haynes 
disagreed, prompting Mora to walk Haynes through how this could be 
torture, engendering the possibility of legal liability for individuals 
associated with this process. Mora thought the problem had been 
solved, but later received a phone call informing him that the reports 
of abuse were continuing. “That’s when I realized that this was not a 
simple mistake,” Mora said, “but that, in fact, people had adopted this 
course of action consciously.” In yet another meeting with Haynes, 
Mora pointed out Secretary Rumsfeld’s handwritten note at the bot-
tom of the authorization page, arguing that “This may be a joke, but it 
would not be regarded as a joke potentially by a prosecuting attorney 
or a plaintiff’s attorney.” (All material above referred to in Murphy 
and Purdum 2009: 7.) 
Abu Ghraib 
In January 2004, prompted by photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez asked Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba 
to conduct a secret investigation into allegations of detainee abuse at 
Abu Ghraib and “lapses in accountability” among the 800th Military 
Police (MP) Brigade (PBS 2005). The report was finished in March 
2004 (Taguba Report 2004), and its classified content leaked to The 
New Yorker. Journalist Seymour Hersh published a story on the report, 
along with photos, in April 2004. On April 28, the TV program 60 
Minutes II aired the story of widespread abuse and humiliation of de-
tainees at Abu Ghraib, reporting that these practices dated back to Oc-
tober 2003. Abu Ghraib was described as a place where US Army 
regulations and the Geneva Conventions were routinely violated, and 
where the priority was on interrogating prisoners and getting intelli-
gence, also by intimidation and torture (Hersh 2004). Maj. Gen. 
Taguba said Secretary Rumsfeld could have avoided the confusion 
down in the ranks if he had a wider range of legal advice (Schlesinger 
2004). The Taguba report confirmed that “systemic and illegal” abuse 
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occurred under the watch of the 372nd Military Police Company in 
Tier 1-A of Abu Ghraib. The evidence consisted of photographs, vid-
eos, and detainee and witness testimony. Taguba argued that Brig. 
Gen. Janis Karpinski, commander of the 800th Military Police Bri-
gade, was to be blamed for poor leadership, and recommended that 
she be relieved of command and be issued a letter of reprimand. He 
also recommended Col. Thomas Pappas, commander of the 205th 
Military Intelligence Brigade, be given a reprimand for failing to en-
sure that his soldiers were trained and were following the interrogation 
rules of engagement.  
 
According to Lawrence Wilkerson, Secretary Rumsfeld should have 
taken responsibility for his role in this travesty of justice. “The twin 
pressures were from Rumsfeld, and they were: Produce intelligence, 
and the gloves are off,” in the words of Wilkerson, “That’s the com-
munication that went down to the field” (Murphy and Purdum 2009: 
10). Alberto Mora has even stronger words about Rumsfeld, arguing 
that Maj. Gen. Taguba “feels now that the proximate causes of Abu 
Ghraib were the O.L.C. memoranda that authorized abusive treat-
ment.” Speaking to journalist Seymour Hersh in 2007, Taguba said,  
 
I know that my peers in the Army will be mad at me for speaking out, but the 
fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare in Abu Ghraib. We violated the 
tenets of the Geneva Convention. We violated our own principles and we violat-
ed the core of our military values. The stress of combat is not an excuse, and I 
believe, even today, that those civilian and military leaders responsible should be 
held accountable (9).  
 
Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently asked former Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger to chair an independent panel to review allegations 
of detainee abuse, and to determine the root causes. The committee’s 
report was released in August 2004. Schlesinger told the press that 
Abu Ghraib “was a kind of animal house on the night shift.” Accord-
ing to the report, MI and MP personnel at Abu Ghraib were “directly 
responsible” for the abuse. The panel also criticized the civilian lead-
ership at the Pentagon, including the Secretary of Defense, as well as 
Gen. Sanchez and his superiors at CENTCOM (U.S. Central Com-
mand), indicating that an atmosphere was created in which “the exist-
ence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies 
contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were 
condoned” (Schlesinger 2004).  
 
The spring and summer of 2004 saw a series of events that challenged 
the Bush administration, capped by the two court decisions Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush (June 28, 2004). Neither went in the Pres-
ident’s favor as regards war powers. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Su-
preme Court decided that whereas Yaser Hamdi (a US citizen cap-
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tured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and held in a military 
prison in Virginia) could be detained until the end of the Afghanistan 
conflict, it was doubtful that such traditional war powers could be ex-
tended indefinitely in a war against al-Qaeda. In fact, once the verdict 
had been pronounced, Hamdi was released to his family in Saudi Ara-
bia, on condition he renounce his US citizenship. The opinion in 
Hamdi construed the AUMF in light of “longstanding law-of-war 
principles,” pushing back against the idea that presidential prerogative 
cancelled out laws of war (Pearlstein 2010). That same day, in Rasul 
v. Bush the Supreme Court also decided that it did have the authority 
to scrutinize the legality of the government’s actions at Guantánamo 
Bay (Goldsmith 2007: 134). It ruled that the detainees’ habeas cases 
could go forward under the federal habeas statute, thereby disagreeing 
with the Bush administration’s claim that these detainees did not have 
right of access to the federal courts to challenge whether they were 
being held lawfully (as Bush’s original Military Order of November 
2001 had stated). Although these opinions were signals that Guantá-
namo was not a “law-free zone,” they had few immediate practical 
consequences for the administration’s policies (ibid: 135).  
 
One of the few immediate results of these decisions was that Secretary 
Rumsfeld on 7 July 2004 established a Combatant Status Review Tri-
bunal (CSRT) process to determine, “in a fact-based proceeding, 
whether individuals detained by the Department of Defense at the US 
Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, are properly classified as enemy 
combatants and to permit each detainee the opportunity to contest 
such designation” (Center for the Study of Human Rights in the 
Americas). It also prompted Congress, in its Detainee Treatment Act 
(2005) to revoke from the Supreme Court its jurisdiction over habeas 
claims by persons detained as “enemy combatants.” Instead a single 
jurisdiction was created in the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit to hear appeals of final decisions of military commis-
sions. 
 
The next year, in 2005, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England 
and John Bellinger, then Legal Advisor to National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, were calling for the facilities at Guantánamo Bay 
to be shut down (Wilkinson 2009). 
George W. Bush 2005–2009:  
Courts and Congress Respond 
By 2005, the courts had begun challenging the legality of the Bush 
administration’s broad claims to presidential prerogative in the war on 
terror. By 2006, the Bush administration was also struggling political-
ly, and Democrats were on their way to winning majorities in both 
Houses of Congress. Bush decided to make changes – though argua-
bly not because of the controversial GWOT, but because of the admin-
istration’s heavily criticized response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Among those dismissed, over Cheney’s strong objections, was Secre-
tary of Defense Rumsfeld. Cheney himself could not be fired as vice 
president, an elective office, but he had become a very toxic figure in 
the White House (Brinkley 2011). 
 
The second administration of George W. Bush came to represent an 
adjustment in the legal approach to the GWOT as a response to legal 
challenges from the Supreme Court. 
I. “Unlawful Enemy Combatants” 
In June 2006, the Supreme Court, in a 5–3 decision,8 handed down 
what National Public Radio reported as being “the most important rul-
ing on executive power in decades, or perhaps ever” (Totenberg 
2006). Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national who was a driver 
and guard for Osama Bin Laden, had been captured in Afghanistan 
during the hostilities in 2001. After President George W. Bush ordered 
that Hamdan be tried by a military commission in 2004, Hamdan filed 
a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that the military commission 
lacked authority to try him since there was no congressional act that 
authorized these commissions.  
 
Hamdan’s counsels also asserted that military commissions were un-
lawful from the procedural and substantive legal points of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Common Article III of the Ge-
neva Conventions. The Bush administration countered that Hamdan 
was not entitled to access to federal courts since he was not a POW 
but rather an enemy combatant. The government also claimed that the 
                                                 
8  Chief Justice John Roberts had ruled in favor of the Bush administration in the appellate 
court (immediately before being nominated to the Supreme Court) and therefore did not 
participate in the ruling. 
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Geneva Conventions did not apply, since the conventions addressed 
only international wars and not conflicts against terrorists. 
 
The US Supreme Court, in its opinion Hamdan v. Rumsfeld – and de-
spite the Detainee Treatment Act’s attempt at stripping the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction – invalidated the military commission system 
established by presidential order. The Court held that, although Con-
gress had in general authorized the use of military commissions, such 
commissions were required to follow procedural rules as similar as 
possible to court-martial proceedings, as required by the UCMJ (Elsea 
2010: 1). Hamdan was a serious challenge to the manner in which the 
administration had conducted the GWOT thus far, specifically with 
regard to the military commissions, and more generally with regard to 
the executive power claimed by the Bush administration.  
 
On the military commissions, the Court rejected the manner in which 
they were currently working, ruling that the government could not 
proceed with military commissions without the express approval of 
Congress. The Court held that a small portion of the Geneva Conven-
tions did apply to the GWOT, granting detainees legal rights of hu-
mane treatment and legal process. Furthermore, the Court’s ruling im-
plied that the 1996 War Crimes Act was applicable to many of the 
administration’s dealings with detainees (Goldsmith 2007, 137). The 
justices argued the commissions violated the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, which affords the right to be present at trial, and the Ge-
neva Conventions, which, the Court noted, may give detainees the 
same rights as US citizens facing military trial (Stohr 2006).  
 
On the issue of presidential war powers, great emphasis was placed on 
“the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of 
war.” This directly challenged the administration’s claim that Con-
gress was without power to limit or regulate the war powers granted 
by the Constitution to the President. The Court explained: 
 
Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional au-
thorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations 
that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his pow-
ers (Greenwald 2006).  
 
Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision by passing the Mili-
tary Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. The aim of the act was to de-
vise new procedures whereby the military commissions system could 
continue working within the confines of the law as defined by the Su-
preme Court in Hamdan. It also contained an amended provision from 
the Detainee Treatment Act, stripping the Supreme Court of habeas 
corpus jurisdiction over enemy combatants. According to professor of 
law Leonard Cutler, the system as laid out in the MCA 2006 lacked 
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“substantive evidentiary requirements as well as fair trial guarantees” 
(Cutler 2010: 71).  
 
The law had been sent to Congress on September 6, 2006 and was en-
acted three weeks later, immediately prior to midterm elections. It au-
thorized many aspects of the military commissions system the Su-
preme Court had invalidated earlier: giving the president a broadened 
definition of “unlawful enemy combatant,” implicit approval of ag-
gressive interrogations short of torture, immunity from prosecution for 
those involved in past interrogations that crossed the prohibited line, 
narrowed interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and amendments 
to the War Crimes Act, eliminating habeas corpus review over Guan-
tánamo and prohibiting the use of the Geneva Conventions to gauge 
the legality of the Guantánamo detentions (Goldsmith 2007: 138). 
John Bellinger, legal adviser to the National Security Council, stated 
in an interview in 2008 that whereas many of the substantive problems 
with the military commissions created by the original order were re-
solved by Congress in response to the Supreme Court decision in 
Hamdan, the efforts of the executive branch have been suffering from 
this original process failure ever since. 
 
One senator in particular accused the Bush administration of timing 
the passage of the MCA to the midterm elections so that no congres-
sional representative would dare vote against it:  
 
Soon, we will adjourn for the fall, and the campaigning will begin in earnest. 
And there will be 30-second attack ads and negative mail pieces, and we will be 
criticized as caring more about the rights of terrorists than the protection of 
Americans. And I know that the vote before us was specifically designed and 
timed to add more fuel to that fire. 
Senator Barack Obama, September 28, 2006. 
 
In 2007, the Council of Europe published its report Guantanamo: vio-
lation of human rights and international law? which demanded the 
immediate extension of POW status to detainees there, “or, at least, 
the United States should allow a ‘competent tribunal’ … to determine 
their status” (Council of Europe 2007: 7). It further argued that the 
United States was in breach of its obligations under the Committee of 
Ministers’ Statutory Resolution (93) 26 on Observer Status and that 
the facility should be opened up to observers from states that had na-
tionals in detention there, as well as to observers from the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross (ibid).  
 
It could be argued that the most fundamental challenge to the Bush 
administration came in 2008, however, with the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Boumediene v. Bush (Wittes et al. 2011). Boumediene was a 
writ of habeas corpus submission on behalf of Guantánamo detainee 
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Lakhdar Boumediene, a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As previ-
ously noted, Guantánamo Bay is not formally part of the United States 
(under the terms of the 1903 lease) but the United States does exercise 
complete jurisdiction and control. The case was consolidated with ha-
beas petition Al Odah v. United States and challenged the legality of 
Boumediene’s detention as well as the constitutionality of the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. On June 12, 2008, Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5–4 majority, which held 
that the prisoners had a right to habeas corpus under the US Constitu-
tion and that the MCA represented an unconstitutional suspension of 
that right. The Court stated that because the United States maintains 
de facto sovereignty over Guantánamo Bay, any aliens detained as 
enemy combatants on that territory were entitled to the writ of habeas 
corpus protected in Article I, Section 9 of the US Constitution (where-
as the Hamdi ruling in 2004 had granted this right to US citizens). This 
case precedent recognized that fundamental rights afforded by the US 
Constitution extend to Guantánamo. Indeed, it repudiated the legality 
of the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Congress’ at-
tempt at overturning the 2004 decisions Hamdi and Rasul (where they 
had eliminated habeas jurisdiction for any “enemy combatant” held in 
US custody as a specific reaction to the ruling previously described in 
Rasul).  As a substitute for habeas review, these laws created a much 
more limited review proceeding in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia for individuals to challenge only the military’s clas-
sification of them as “enemy combatants.” In Boumediene v. Bush, the 
Court held that detainees at Guantánamo had a constitutional right to 
file petitions for habeas corpus in US federal court challenging the 
lawfulness of their detention (Center for Constitutional Rights 2008). 
Again, the Bush administration had to make adjustments in its legal 
framework. 
 
Morris Davis, GITMO prosecutor from 2005 to 2007, has been highly 
critical of such adjustments to the military commissions system – be-
cause he considers the system too flawed to reform: 
 
I honestly believed we were committed to full, fair and open trials when I be-
came chief prosecutor in 2005, but I lost confidence in that commitment over 
time as political appointees tried to manipulate the process and make it more like 
a theatrical production than a judicial proceeding.  After more than a decade of 
futility and failure, the question is no longer whether the U.S. could proceed with 
“reformed again and again and again military commissions,” but whether it 
should (Davis 2012). 
II.  “Enhanced Interrogation Methods” 
“The United States does not torture. Its against our laws, and it’s 
against our values,” Bush asserted on September 6, 2006, when 14 
high-value detainees were transferred to Guantánamo from secret CIA 
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prisons (Danner 2009: 1; Woodward 2009). Bush explained that in 
addition to Guantánamo, some suspected terrorist leaders and opera-
tives captured during the war had been held and questioned outside 
the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and using “an alternative set of procedures.” Further: 
“These procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, 
our Constitution, and our treaty obligations.” President Bush added 
that the Department of Justice had “reviewed the authorized methods 
extensively and determined them to be lawful,” which is what the pre-
viously mentioned Yoo–Bybee memoranda were for (Danner 2009: 
1). Later that month, Congress, facing midterm elections, duly passed 
the President’s Military Commissions Act of 2006, which, among oth-
er things, sought to shelter from prosecution those who had applied 
the “alternative set of procedures” and had done so, said the President, 
“in a thorough and professional way” (ibid).  
 
From October 6 to 11 and then from December 4 to 14, 2006, officials 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross – whose official and 
legally recognized duties include monitoring compliance with the Ge-
neva Conventions and supervising treatment of prisoners of war – 
traveled to Guantánamo and began interviewing the fourteen “high-
value detainees” who had been transferred from the CIA “black sites” 
to Guantánamo. The report, sent to the CIA’s acting general counsel 
John Rizzo on February 14, 2007, concluded: 
 
The allegations of ill-treatment of the detainees indicate that, in many cases, the 
ill-treatment to which they were subjected while held in the CIA program, either 
singly or in combination, constituted torture. In addition, many other elements of 
the ill-treatment, either singly or in combination, constituted cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment (ICRC 2007: 26). 
 
This despite the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, a bill sponsored by 
famous ex-POW and Senator John McCain (R–Ariz.), clarifying that 
the international ban on “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” ap-
plied wherever US officials operate. On December 30, 2005 Bush 
signed the bill into law, but attached a “signing statement” laying out 
his own interpretation, which indicated that he was not otherwise 
bound by the law in any meaningful way. Indeed, when Congress 
passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, it authorized the CIA 
to continue to use harsher interrogation techniques than those permit-
ted the military (as set out in the Army Field Manual) (Cutler 2010: 
67). Furthermore, when Congress in 2008 passed a law that would 
have forced the CIA to comply with the Field Manual’s Humane 
Treatment Standard, President Bush vetoed it (ibid).   
 
In the wake of the ICRC report one can, writes Mark Danner (2009), 
argue the following: Beginning in the spring of 2002 the US govern-
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ment began to torture prisoners. This torture, approved by the Presi-
dent and monitored daily by senior officials, including the nation’s 
highest law enforcement officer, clearly violated major treaty obliga-
tions of the United States, including the Geneva Conventions and the 
Convention Against Torture, as well as US law (2009: 6; Human 
Rights Watch 2011a). As for the CIA’s “alternative sets of proce-
dures” mentioned above, extensive leaks to the press, from officials 
supportive of and critical of these “procedures,” undermined a highly 
secret program, writes Danner (2009). As a result, CIA officials de-
stroyed, “apparently out of fear of eventual exposure and possible 
prosecution,” as many as 92 video recordings that had been made of 
the interrogations. These recordings could have played a critical part 
in the effort to determine what benefits, if any, the program brought to 
the security of the United States. Of course, they could also have 
played a part in criminal proceedings against officials who had en-
gaged in torture. 
 
With the Bush administration on its way out in 2008, various admin-
istration officials gave interviews. Vice President Cheney, in an inter-
view to Washington Times in December, defended his stance on “en-
hanced interrogation” by arguing that the administration had spent “a 
great deal of time and effort getting legal advice… of the Office of 
Legal Counsel” and that “I don’t think it was torture.” Cheney said 
that the CIA had “handled itself very appropriately,” and concluded 
that it was “directly responsible for the fact that we’ve been able to 
avoid or defeat further attacks against the homeland for seven and a 
half years” (Cutler 2010: 67–68; Ward and Solomon, 2008). Indeed, 
in his memoir In My Time (Cheney & Cheney 2011), the former vice 
president argues that the “enhanced interrogation” that he helped cre-
ate was not torture. Waterboarding, in his view, was perfectly legal 
because the Office of Legal Counsel had determined it to be such. 
Cheney also defends his famous statement that the United States now 
had to work “the dark side.” Also Donald Rumsfeld dismisses charges 
of torture in his memoir Known and Unknown (Rumsfeld 2011). His 
reasoning is twofold: either the Defense Department did not partici-
pate in torture, or the techniques it employed were “legal and humane” 
(Brinkley 2011).  
 
Another official who gave an interview was Susan Crawford, the top 
Bush administration official in charge of deciding which criminal 
charges to bring against the detainees in Guantánamo (and a former 
US judge on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). Crawford 
told Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward that the United States 
in fact was guilty of torture because the treatment of Mohammed al-
Qahtani, the suspected twentieth hijacker, “met the legal definition of 
torture.” Indeed, that was the reason she did not refer the case for 
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prosecution (Mayer 2009: 342). Crawford also stated that the Bush 
administration had created a nigh-unsolvable problem for the incom-
ing administration: the Obama administration would “inherit” prison-
ers who could neither be tried nor released. “And unfortunately what 
this has done,” said Crawford, is that it “has tainted everything going 
forward.”  
 
In December 2008, a Senate Armed Services Committee report con-
cluded that “Rumsfeld's authorization of aggressive interrogation 
techniques for use at Guantánamo Bay was a direct cause of detainee 
abuse there.” The committee found the interrogation techniques harsh 
and abusive but stopped short of calling them torture (Woodward 
2009). According to The New York Times and National Public Radio’s 
“Guantanamo Docket,” five men had died at Guantánamo by the time 
President Bush left office. 
Keep the Change, or Barack H. Obama 
2009–2011 
As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals. 
Barack Obama, Inaugural Address 20 January 2009 
 
In 2008, Jane Mayer, an investigative reporter at The New Yorker, 
published what became a best-seller, The Dark Side, chronicling – and 
criticizing – the Bush administration’s GWOT policies. It was a pes-
simistic and searing book. In the afterword to the 2009 edition, how-
ever, Mayer expresses hopes as to the newly elected president, Barack 
Obama, because candidate Obama provided a strong rhetorical de-
fense of constitutional rights in the War on Terror on the campaign 
trail (Mayer 2009). Unlike many Democrats before him, Obama did 
not try to “out-hawk” his Republican opponent, Arizona Senator John 
McCain, but rather defended the (potentially controversial) stance that 
terrorists have a right to habeas corpus when detained by the United 
States. And indeed, Obama took some remarkable action immediately 
upon entering the White House. On January 22, 2009, he ordered the 
military prison camp at Guantánamo Bay to be closed within a year; 
he suspended military commissions while a task force studied options 
(the Detainee Policy Task Force created by Executive Order 13493); 
he prohibited CIA “black sites”; he decreed that the International 
Committee for the Red Cross should be granted access to all prisoners 
held by the United States; and he nullified earlier legal memoranda on 
interrogation policy during the Bush administration, and ordered that 
all prisoners be afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions 
(repealing President Bush’s Executive Order 13440 on the meaning of 
Common Article 3 as applied to US interrogation operations) (Pearl-
stein 2010). Obama also categorized waterboarding as torture, thereby 
banning the practice. He announced that the United States intended to 
win the fight against terror, but that “we are going to win it on our 
own terms” (Mayer 2009: 340). 
 
The people he brought with him also signaled a new era. The nomi-
nated head of the influential Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice 
Department was Dawn Johnson, a law professor who had previously 
criticized the Bush administration for devising “bogus constitutional 
arguments for outlandishly expansive executive power” (ibid). Her 
potential boss, Eric Holder, when asked during his confirmation hear-
ings in the Senate whether waterboarding was torture, answered a loud 
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and clear, “Yes.” Indeed, Harold Hongju Koh, the new Legal Advisor 
to the State Department, had written an essay titled “America’s Jekyll-
and-Hyde-Exceptionalism” where he criticized what he called the 
“double standard” that the United States had been applying to interna-
tional human rights law (2005). Koh argued against the double stand-
ard exhibited in the post-9/11 environment, “particularly, America’s 
attitude toward the global justice system, and holding Taliban detain-
ees on Guantánamo without Geneva Convention hearings…” (2005: 
117). What Koh found the most troubling about the Bush administra-
tion’s response to 9/11 was that it made the double standard (one for 
the United States and another for the rest of the world) not just the ex-
ception, but the rule (128).9 Koh argued against what he deemed a 
“rights-free zone” at Guantánamo and lauded the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rasul v. Bush (2004) for affirming the rights of habeas 
corpus to “enemy combatants” being held there (2005: 138–139). He 
held that, since these prisoners were being subjected to punishment 
exclusively under US law, they would also have to be afforded ave-
nues to object to that punishment, arguing eloquently against the idea 
that it was acceptable to have “rights-free territory” and “rights-free 
people” (139–140). 
 
As of early spring 2009, there was little reason to doubt the sincerity 
with which the Obama administration set about making fundamental 
changes to the policies of the previous administration. In a major na-
tional security speech held at the National Archives in May 2009, 
President Obama criticized his predecessor for pursuing an “ad hoc 
legal approach for fighting terrorism that was neither effective nor 
sustainable –  a framework that failed to rely on our legal traditions 
and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a com-
pass” (Obama 2009c). He pledged to work with Congress to develop 
an appropriate legal regime for detention of terror suspects who can-
not be prosecuted or released. “From Europe to the Pacific, we've 
been the nation that has shut down torture chambers and replaced tyr-
anny with the rule of law,” Obama said. “That is who we are” (ibid). 
But, in that same speech, he also announced the fate of the various 
groups of detainees in Guantánamo, an announcement that proved to 
be a harbinger of future difficulties. President Obama explained that 
some would be tried in federal courts (for violations of federal law); a 
second group would be tried by reconstituted military commissions 
(for violations of laws of war); the third group had been ordered re-
leased by the courts; the fourth group were those deemed safe to trans-
fer to other countries; and the fifth group were those who could nei-
                                                 
9  I would argue that this has been the rule for a long time, but that is not the issue here. See 
Hilde Eliassen Restad, Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of American Exceptional-
ism and Unilateralism (PhD. diss., University of Virginia, 2010). 
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ther be tried nor released – in other words, they would have to be sub-
ject to “prolonged detention” (2009; Cutler 2010: 70).   
 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the new path taken by the Obama admin-
istration soon encountered significant obstacles, amounting to what 
currently may best be described as a dead end. Dawn Johnson, for ex-
ample, withdrew her candidacy after a year-long battle in the Senate. 
She was never confirmed, nor did the President work very hard to 
make that happen. As Leonard Cutler argues, as of 2010, several 
Obama administration detainee policies were closer to Bush admin-
istration policies “as modified and impacted by Congress and the 
Court” than Obama’s voters would have predicted in 2008 (Cutler 
2010: 63). Cutler sees primarily two reasons for this: institutional 
path-dependency – that is, policies that are difficult to reverse – and 
the “learning process” undergone in the transition from senator to 
president. By this Cutler seems to mean that Obama came to change 
his mind after entering the White House.  
I. Guantánamo Bay and its Prisoners 
On his second day in office, President Obama signed Executive Order 
13492, which directed that GITMO military prison be closed “as soon 
as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of the order.” At 
the time of this Executive Order, some 240 inmates were being held, 
150 of whom were eligible for release or transfer to another nation 
(Cutler 2010: 69). The new administration stopped calling Guantána-
mo inmates “enemy combatants” on March 13, 2009 instead using the 
term “unprivileged enemy belligerents.” The Justice Department filed 
court papers outlining a further legal and linguistic shift from the poli-
cies of Bush. “As we work toward developing a new policy to govern 
detainees, it is essential that we operate in a manner that strengthens 
our national security, is consistent with our values, and is governed by 
law,” US Attorney General Holder said in a statement (Mikkelsen 
2009). “The government may have eliminated the term enemy com-
batant but it is still claiming the authority to detain people far beyond 
the traditional norms of humanitarian law,” countered attorney Devon 
Chaffee of the group Human Rights First.  
 
The filing stated that the standards of President Barack Obama’s ad-
ministration for holding terrorism suspects without court review were 
to be based not on the president’s authority as Commander-in-Chief 
(as Bush’s had been), but on laws passed by Congress (such as the 
AUMF) and, by extension, international law including the Geneva 
Conventions (Mikkelsen 2009). 
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Trial and Error 
In March 2009, the Obama administration filed a brief in the Hamlily 
habeas litigation that departed only in three relatively minor ways 
from the earlier approach of the Bush administration: First, the new 
administration asserted that henceforth its claim to detention authority 
would rest on the AUMF, rather than on any claim of inherent Article 
II power, and that its AUMF-based authority was to be construed in 
accordance with the laws of war. Second, the Obama administration 
dropped the label “enemy combatant” in favor of the less provocative 
practice of referring simply to “persons detainable pursuant to the 
AUMF” (Wittes et al. 2011: 23–24). The first two claims were rela-
tively uncontroversial as seen by the courts. But in its third move, the 
administration asserted that its detention authority extended both to 
members of AUMF-covered groups and to non-members who provide 
substantial support to such groups. The administration’s filing said 
only those who provided “substantial” support to al-Qaeda, the Tali-
ban or similar groups – or who were “part” of those groups – would be 
considered candidates for detention. Human rights groups were begin-
ning to show skepticism, however. Some argued the policies would 
still allow the United States to detain prisoners seized far from a bat-
tlefield and that key definitions were left out, such as what constitutes 
“substantial” support for a militant group. “In key elements they are a 
continuation of the Bush administration,” argued attorney Hina 
Shamsi of the American Civil Liberties Union. “This is really a case 
of old wine in new bottles,” said the Center for Constitutional Rights 
in New York, which represents several Guantánamo prisoners (Mik-
kelsen 2009). 
 
In May that year, despite having voted against the Military Commis-
sions Act in 2006 as senator, President Obama announced that his ad-
ministration was considering restarting the military commission sys-
tem, with some changes to the procedural rules. Congress subsequent-
ly enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2009 in October as part of 
the Department of Defense’s Authorization Act (NDAA). The Act 
was a clear improvement upon the original MCA of 2006, passed by 
Congress in an attempt at modifying the parts of the military commis-
sions system the Supreme Court had struck down in its decision in 
Hamdan in 2006. The MCA 2009 removed a provision in the 2006 
law that had limited the ability of defendants to invoke the Geneva 
Conventions (“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by 
military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Con-
ventions as a source of rights”). The reforms further rendered inad-
missible any statements taken as a result of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment; required the government to disclose more potentially 
exculpatory information; restricted hearsay evidence; and generally 
required that statements of the accused be admitted only if they were 
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provided voluntarily (Crooks 2010: 278). The new law also defined 
cruel or inhuman treatment as treatment that violates Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions (whereas MCA 2006 defined it as an act 
“intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffer-
ing, including serious physical abuse”) (Cutler 2010: 75).  Finally, 
MCA 2009 changed the categorization of detainees from “unlawful 
enemy combatants” to “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” defining 
such a person as someone who either engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners; or someone who purposefully 
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
alition partners (ibid).  
 
Within the confines of the commissions system, the new MCA was in 
many respects an improvement upon the first version. It attempted to 
ensure a greater degree of fairness for detainees (Cutler 2010: 76). 
Harold Koh actually went as far as to argue that military commissions 
are an “appropriate venue” for trying persons for violations of laws of 
war (Koh, in Crooks 2010: 278). Unsurprisingly, human rights organi-
zations disagreed fundamentally. “Tinkering with the discredited mili-
tary commissions system is not enough,” declared Joanne Mariner, 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism Program director at Human Rights 
Watch, in 2009. “Although the pending military commissions legisla-
tion makes important improvements on the Bush administration's sys-
tem, the commissions remain a substandard system of justice” (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2009). Former GITMO prosecutor Morris Davis 
has agreed, arguing that the Bush administration’s initial notion that 
military commissions would be more swift, more secret and more se-
vere than federal courts has been proven wrong (Davis 2012). He 
notes that only six military commission trials have been completed in 
the decade from 2001 to 2012.  Two of those six – what the Bush ad-
ministration called the “worst of the worst” war criminals – David 
Hicks and Salim Hamdan – have already served their short military 
commission sentences and are free men back in their home countries. 
Over the same period, hundreds of terrorism-related cases were tried 
with success and without incident in federal courts, typically resulting 
in sentences that exceeded those of military commissions by a wide 
margin.  
 
The Obama administration thus aimed at allowing the federal justice 
system try certain detainees. In November 2009, Attorney General Er-
ic Holder announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the self-
described mastermind of 9/11) and four others accused of the same 
crime were to be tried in federal court in New York. This was a major 
policy reversal from the Bush administration, and clearly a bold move 
on the part of the Obama administration. Immediately, Republicans in 
Congress (and many local politicians in New York on both sides of 
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the aisle) expressed public outrage at the decision. President Obama 
argued that any discomfort with this civilian process would disappear 
once Mohammed was sentenced to the death penalty (Cutler 2010: 
77). But the political pressure was kept up; Attorney General Holder 
soon bowed to pressure from New York politicians, moving the trial 
out of Manhattan. No other location was secured, however, and in the 
subsequent congressional lame-duck session that followed the Repub-
lican victories in the November 2010 elections, Congress voted to bar 
the transfer of any prisoners from Guantánamo to the mainland United 
States (New York Times 2011a). This meant that the Obama admin-
istration was unable to transfer Mohammed and the other four detain-
ees for trial anywhere in the United States for the fiscal year 2010. On 
April 4, 2011, Holder announced that Mohammed and the other four 
detainees were to be tried by a military commission at Guantánamo 
Bay. 
Guantánamo and Indefinite Detention 
By February 2010, there were reportedly 192 detainees still being held 
at Guantánamo (Porges 2010) and by January 2012, 171 detainees 
(Warren 2012). An “indefinite detainee” was categorized by the 
Obama administration’s 2009 Guantánamo Review Task Force as 
someone against whom the United States had no evidence to convict 
of a war crime but had concluded was too dangerous to let go (Guan-
tánamo Review Task Force Final Report 2010). The “indefinite de-
tainee” group makes up 46 of those 171 detainees. 
 
A question closely related to the formal scope of the president’s deten-
tion authority concerns whether prisoners may be detained indefinite-
ly. The current legal regime for capture and detention “seems unstable 
and a recipe for confusion as long as it lasts” (Wittes et al.,: 38).  Until 
the fall of 2011, the consensus among federal judges seemed to be that 
the government’s detention authority lasts until the end of the relevant 
conflict. As Justice O’Connor wrote for the Hamdi plurality, the Court 
understood Congress’ grant of authority in the AUMF “to include the 
authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict” (Wittes et 
al. 2011: 39). The Court acknowledged that the conflict with the Tali-
ban was somewhat atypical, and noted that its understanding of Con-
gress’s authority to detain might be altered if “the practical circum-
stances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that 
informed the development of the law of war.” Nevertheless, the Court 
emphasized, that was not yet the reality: “Active combat operations 
against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan . . . [I]f 
the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in 
active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are . . . authorized.” 
(ibid). 
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But how long will the practical circumstances remain sufficiently 
close to those of prior wars, and how long will active combat opera-
tions against a relevant group continue? The lower courts have been 
faced with detainees’ arguments that the “relevant conflict” has now 
ended. As yet, these courts do not believe that the government’s de-
tention power is ending (Wittes et al. 2011). At the same time, the 
government has acknowledged in public statements that the AUMF as 
an instrument might not have indefinite vitality. This issue is thus like-
ly to arise more frequently, and with greater power, in the future than 
it has so far (ibid: 40). The D.C. Circuit seems content with the view 
that detention may be justified as long as the political branches con-
firm that hostilities have not yet ended. But the non-traditional nature 
of the conflict presents grave challenges to such a political decision. 
Covert operations may continue even long after the United States has 
officially ended its war in Afghanistan. As former Assistant Attorney 
General for National Security David Kris put it, “as circumstances 
change, if combat operations are concluded someday, it’s not totally 
clear . . . how long into the future that detention authority will en-
dure.” (Kris 2010; Wittes et al. 2011: 48). 
 
The answer to question, “How long can the US government detain 
someone?” came on December 31, 2011. On that day, President 
Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 
(NDAA) into law. Having first threatened to veto the bill, Obama 
agreed to sign the NDAA after Congress removed a part that sought to 
prevent civilian law enforcement – like the FBI – from capturing and 
prosecuting al-Qaeda suspects within the United States (giving this 
authority instead to the military). This would of course have been a 
controversial militarization of domestic law enforcement. That is not 
why President Obama threatened to veto the bill, however. The threat 
came because the provision was seen as an unacceptable encroach-
ment on executive power (Sullivan 2011). The bill engendered strong 
criticism from Obama’s supporters on the left, including a harshly 
worded editorial from The New York Times, because, as they wrote, 
the bill included “terrible new measures that will make indefinite de-
tention and military trials a permanent part of American law” (New 
York Times 2011b). This is puzzling, noted the editorial, as civilian 
law enforcement and the domestic justice system has been much more 
effective in trying terror suspects than have the military (ibid.). The 
most troubling aspect of the bill is perhaps that it makes explicit and 
legal the previously only alleged executive power of indefinite deten-
tion without trial of terror suspects (Sullivan 2011). Finally, the bill 
makes it impossible to close Guantánamo Bay (New York Times 
2011b). “President Obama’s action today is a blight on his legacy be-
cause he will forever be known as the president who signed indefinite 
detention without charge or trial into law,” stated Anthony D. 
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Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU 2011). 
 
On January 7, 2012, a remarkable op-ed was published in The New 
York Times. Writing of his experience of being designated an “unlaw-
ful enemy combatant,” Lakdhar Boumediene, of Boumediene v. Bush 
(2008), argued that his detention had been a mistake from the begin-
ning: he was not, nor had he ever been, a terrorist (Boumediene 2011). 
Pointing out the necessity of a competent tribunal to determine the 
legal status of detainees, Boumediene wrote: “Had I been brought be-
fore a court when I was seized, my children’s lives would not have 
been torn apart, and my family would not have been thrown into pov-
erty.” Lakhdar Boumediene exemplifies what the American Civil Lib-
erties Union calls the two false premises on which Guantánamo was 
predicated: that the men sent there were all terrorists picked up on the 
battlefield; and that, as “unlawful enemy combatants,” they had no 
legal rights. In reality, a very small percentage of the prisoners were 
captured by US forces; the vast majority had been seized by Pakistani 
and Afghan militias, tribesmen, and officials, and sold to the United 
States for large bounties (ACLU 2012).  
II. “Enhanced Interrogation Methods”: Ending Torture? 
On January 22, 2009, Human Rights Watch stated that President 
Obama’s actions to ban torture would “restore the moral authority and 
strengthen the national security of the United States.” One year later 
their executive director Kenneth Roth argued in Foreign Affairs that it 
would not be enough for the government to stop using torture; perpe-
trators would also have to be punished (Roth 2010). The Obama ad-
ministration has not been eager to investigate or prosecute anyone 
who ordered or committed torture in the previous administration. In its 
campaign to end torture, the administration has succeeded in halting 
the practice, yet its refusal to pursue accountability for the transgres-
sions of the previous administration means the progress is temporary 
at best.  
Dealing with the CIA 
As president-elect, Obama had several meetings with the intelligence 
community, described in Woodward’s Obama’s Wars (2010). On De-
cember 9, 2008, Obama met with CIA Director Michael Hayden and 
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell in Chicago. 
Among other things, he was briefed on the changes made in 2006 to 
the “enhanced interrogation techniques” used by the CIA. Prior to 
2006, there had been thirteen techniques allowed: now there were only 
six. After the change in 2006, waterboarding was no longer allowed. 
The new techniques apparently centered around sleep deprivation, 
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“the lone technique that worked on hard-core terrorists” (Woodward 
2010: 54). This marked a line of separation between the CIA and the 
military, as the military was allowed to use only those interrogation 
techniques sanctioned by the Army Field Manual. It was apparently 
the opinion of CIA Director Hayden that the existence of the harsher 
program run by the CIA was important, as it let terrorists know they 
would be treated differently were they to be picked up the CIA rather 
than detained by the US military (ibid: 55). When Hayden met with 
his successor, former White House Chief of Staff under Clinton, Leon 
Panetta, he told Panetta never to use the words “CIA” and “torture” in 
the same sentence again (as Panetta had done in writing while out of 
office). “Torture is a felony, Leon,” Hayden said. And displaying 
Bush administration logic, since the Bush Justice Department had ap-
proved the CIA’s actions in detailed memos, what the CIA had done 
could not be torture (Woodward 2010: 60).  The December meeting in 
Chicago was not the success Hayden had thought it was, however, as 
Obama was later to abolish the CIA’s post-2006 interrogation pro-
gram and instruct the company to follow the Army Field Manual (ibid: 
56).  
 
On Thursday, April 16, 2009 President Barack Obama released four 
redacted Office of Legal Counsel memoranda from the Bush admin-
istration to the CIA justifying torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment. This he did, not in order to follow through on his campaign 
promise of transparency, but in response to a lawsuit initiated by the 
American Civil Liberties Union (Fein 2009). As a candidate in 2008, 
Obama had stated: “We’ll reject torture — without exception or equi-
vocation” (Lewis 2011). And, as we saw above, during his first month 
in office, the president honored this campaign pledge, signing an ex-
ecutive order prohibiting torture or inhuman treatment. There is no 
reason, says Lewis, to doubt that the order has been followed. The 
problem, however, is that torture still remains an option for a future 
US administration – because the Obama administration rejected op-
portunities to “erect a high legal wall against the return of torture” 
(ibid). President Obama has made it clear that large-scale criminal 
prosecutions for torture will not happen; he has opposed the creation 
of a truth commission to examine events comprehensively; and he has 
intervened to stop civil litigation by detainees against their torturers 
(ibid).  
 
The Convention against Torture requires criminal investigation where 
there are credible allegations of torture, but the Obama administration 
has said the USA needs “to look forward as opposed to looking back-
wards” (Johnston and Savage 2009). A federal prosecutor did review 
101 cases in which agency officers and contractors interrogated sus-
pected terrorists during years of military action after the 9/11 attacks, 
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but found cause to pursue criminal cases in only two, neither of which 
included former high-level  Bush administration officials. “It is diffi-
cult to understand the prosecutor’s conclusion that only those two 
deaths warrant further investigation,” notes Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union (Finn and Tate 2011). 
 
Furthermore, the Obama administration still has a program to render 
terrorist suspects to their countries of origin. Indeed, this should not 
come as a surprise, as former CIA director Leon Panetta (now Secre-
tary of Defense) told the Senate during his confirmation hearings in 
February 2009 that this program would continue with “appropriate 
assurances from the host government that the people would not be 
mistreated” (Urban 2011).  
 
According to The New York Times and National Public Radio’s 
“Guantánamo Docket,” three men have died at Guantánamo since 
President Obama took office. 
Analysis: Path Dependency versus 
Hope & Change 
In March 2009, the Obama administration sent out a memo to the Pen-
tagon stating that the administration wanted its staff to stop using the 
term “Global War on Terror.” It preferred, instead, “overseas contin-
gency operations” (Wilson and Kamen 2009). But, aside from the 
rhetoric, has all that much changed from Bush to Obama?  
 
It seems likely that Obama’s adherents would argue that had he been 
president in 2001, many things would have been different. The Obama 
Justice Department has been demonstrably less skeptical toward inter-
national law than was the Bush Justice Department. Those who voted 
for Obama in 2008 might then argue that an Obama Justice Depart-
ment would not have erected the GWOT legal edifice based on the 
goal of circumventing the Geneva Conventions, the Convention 
Against Torture, as well as the federal justice system. This we can 
never know, of course. We cannot know what parts of the continua-
tion of the Bush administration’s war on terror was a result of path 
dependency, and what parts were the result of the logic of executive 
power. 
 
When Obama entered office in 2009, the changes he had promised as 
a candidate were quickly abandoned. Indeed, any real change in the 
way the United States fights its war on terror came not from the 
Obama administration, but from the judicial branch. The role of the 
courts has been important, challenging the executive – and the legisla-
tive – branch in its claims of executive power in time of national secu-
rity crisis. 
The Role of the Courts: 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the debate over military detention of terrorist 
suspects has focused mainly on the question of whether federal judges 
could exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainees at Guantána-
mo Bay. In Boumediene (2008), the Supreme Court answered that 
question in the affirmative. The ruling held that detainees at Guantá-
namo are under US jurisdiction and can therefore appeal on the basis 
of habeas corpus, and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 un-
constitutionally restricted this right. With this decision however, argue 
Wittes et al., the Supreme Court also “declined to address a number of 
the critical questions that define the contours of any non-criminal de-
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tention system.” (2011: 1) Indeed, Congress could have legislated to 
define the rules, but as has been tradition since World War II, Con-
gress chose not to do so, in deference to the executive. Thus it has 
fallen to the judicial and the executive branch to map out this new area 
of law.  
 
As much as Boumediene was lauded by human rights organizations, it 
did not mark the end. In an editorial in February 2011, The New York 
Times excoriated the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, the only circuit where detainees can challenge their 
detention, for “dramatically restrict[ing] the Boumediene ruling” 
(2011c).  
A Sub-Standard System of Justice 
Alexander Hamilton once called “arbitrary imprisonments” by the ex-
ecutive “the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.” In 
Boumediene, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy stressed that habeas is less 
about detainees’ rights, important as they are, than about the vital ju-
dicial power to check undue use of executive power. Whereas the fed-
eral justice system has challenged important aspects of the Bush era 
GWOT, it has not overturned it completely. According to John 
Bellinger III, a former Bush administration official, one of the great 
tragedies of that administration has been the damage caused by its de-
tainee policies – the decision to set up Guantánamo without the in-
volvement of the international community; the issuance of the presi-
dent’s executive order creating military commissions, aspects of the 
CIA interrogation program; renditions; and the decision about the in-
applicability of the Geneva Conventions (Murphy & Purdum 2009: 7). 
The most serious error, according to Bollinger, is not any of these de-
cisions individually or even collectively, but the administration’s ina-
bility to change course as the magnitude of the problems caused by 
these decisions became apparent. Instead, in a move later adopted by 
the Obama administration, the Bush administration adapted its ap-
proach so as to conform to the Supreme Court rulings, rather than 
starting afresh. With the Military Commissions Act of 2009, President 
Obama placed himself squarely behind this post-9/11 legal edifice.  
 
In July 2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights pub-
lished a statement noting that it continued to be deeply troubled by the 
Obama administration’s actions with regard to terror detainees. In 
many cases, they wrote, “the writ of habeas corpus does not appear to 
constitute an effective remedy for those individuals whose ongoing 
detention has been found to be unwarranted” (IACHR 2011). With 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, the United States recognized that the 
“laws of war” govern the detention and treatment of the detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay. The law of war, however, “provides for a party to 
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the conflict to deprive combatants of their liberty as a security meas-
ure for the duration of hostilities,” a problem complicated even further 
by the fact that, in contrast to a traditional armed conflict, it seems un-
likely that there will be a definitive end to the war on terror (ibid).  
 
This system of military detention and trials has now been codified into 
law with the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). As 
Human Rights Watch states, whereas over 400 people have been pros-
ecuted in US federal courts for terrorism-related offenses in the last 
ten years, only six cases have been prosecuted in the military commis-
sions (2011b). Whereas Bush had poured the foundation and built the 
house, President Obama has been adding a new wing to it, rather than 
tearing it down and making a fresh start.  
The Role of Congress 
What role has Congress played in Obama’s opportunities for changing 
course in the fight against terrorism? Some would argue that the prox-
imate reason for Obama’s failure to close Guantánamo within the year 
was political opposition from Congress. And certainly, politics played 
a large role in complicating Obama’s effort at fulfilling that particular 
campaign promise. The administration’s plan was to acquire an Illi-
nois prison, the Thompson Correction Center, and transfer GITMO 
detainees there. Whereas this plan had support from Illinois Governor 
Patrick Quinn and Democratic Senator Richard Durbin (as they be-
lieved retrofitting and running the facility would create a significant 
number of local jobs), it met with fierce opposition in Congress. In-
deed, Congress has used its spending oversight authority both to pre-
vent the White House from financing trials of Guantánamo captives 
on US soil and to block the acquisition of the Illinois prison. 
 
Here it might be pointed out that presidents are not mere captives of 
congressional preferences. A US president has the ability to put the 
weight of the executive office behind certain political causes and push 
for congressional acquiescence. However, that does not seem to have 
happened in this instance. 
Accountability 
The question of accountability was largely bracketed by the Obama 
administration through several statements emphasizing the need to 
“move forward.” “It would be unfair to prosecute dedicated men and 
women working to protect America for conduct that was sanctioned in 
advance by the Justice Department,” Attorney General Eric Holder 
said in a statement in the spring of 2009 (Johnson and Tate, 2009). In 
effect, the “golden shield” developed in the early Bush administration 
seems to have been a success. As Obama nears the completion of his 
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first term, no one will be held accountable for the practices which he 
as a candidate condemned. Congress, unsurprisingly, has also stayed 
away from the issue. As has been tradition since the World War II 
(with such notable exceptions as the controversial investigation into 
the intelligence community in the 1970s), Congress has preferred not 
to exercise its oversight power in the realm of foreign affairs. The 
strategy of the Obama administration seems to have been to make 
clear changes in how the country pursues the fight against terrorism, 
rather than focusing on the legal accountability of previous missteps. 
As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated in its re-
port, clear information had not been presented to indicate whether the 
allegations of torture at Guantánamo Bay had been investigated with a 
view to prosecuting and punishing the responsible parties. Reminding 
the State Department that the United States is required to conduct such 
investigations by virtue of its international obligations; the Commis-
sion argued that independent and impartial investigations into alleged 
acts of torture are an indispensable basis to avoid impunity and the 
repetition of such acts in the future (IACHR 2011). 
 
If the Obama administration fails in making the policy changes prom-
ised in the 2008 campaign, then, there will have been neither account-
ability nor a fundamental change in how the United States wages its 
post-Bush administration “war on terror.”  
Keep the Change? 
The Obama administration would undoubtedly argue that it has al-
ready made many changes. One area where this seems to be correct is 
that of “enhanced interrogation methods.” When it comes to the deten-
tion of suspected terrorists, however, the picture is much more mud-
dled. President Obama did not really follow through on his pledge in 
May 2009 to work with Congress to develop a legal regime for the 
detention of terror suspects, and Congress should have been more re-
sponsive to the concerns of counterterrorism officials in the executive 
branch (Waxman & Bellinger, 2011). Many of the difficult long-term 
questions Obama inherited – such as who may be detained, where 
should detainees be held, and according to which legal processes – 
have remained unresolved.  
 
It seems clear that the main difference between President Bush and 
President Obama is one of rhetoric. Obama has spoken eloquently 
about respect for constitutional values and has advocated controversial 
policies including the closure of Guantánamo Bay and the trial of 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in federal court. From the viewpoint of his 
own political base, his shortcomings can be viewed as political (not 
managing to outplay his political opponents) or personal (changing his 
views upon becoming president). Judging from the early actions taken 
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by the Obama administration, it seems fairly clear that the intention 
was to rein in the policies of the Bush era and move closer to interna-
tional law. It is entirely possible – indeed likely – that candidate 
Obama meant what he said on the campaign trail in 2008, but that – 
when confronted not only with the awesome powers afforded the US 
president, but also with the threat scenarios presented to him from the 
vast intelligence community – President Obama decided he was wiser 
than the previous president and would therefore be a better steward of 
the power of his office. As Pearlstein (2010) has noted, post-
Boumediene Bush policies do not differ much from the pre-
Guantánamo closure Obama administration – which it appears that the 
entire duration of the Obama administration will be.  
Conclusion: Balancing on the Brink  
Being a wise steward of presidential powers is no simple task. Being a 
wise steward of presidential powers in a time of national security 
threats is perhaps an impossible demand in a democracy. In its 1866 
ruling in Ex Parte Milligan, the US Supreme Court set one of the very 
first precedents on the issue of wartime executive powers. Reacting to 
President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
(in certain areas of the North) during the Civil War, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in 
war and peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at 
all times and in all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious conse-
quences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can 
be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. 
 
Presidential prerogative, the idea that the executive must sometimes 
go beyond the written word of the Constitution to act in accordance 
with what the president feels is the best interest of the nation 
(Scigliano 1981) – that was the Bush administration’s approach to the 
war on terror. What proponents of Congress call a constitutional part-
nership, proponents of presidential prerogative call “exercising tradi-
tional executive functions.” Prominent among the presidential prerog-
atives argued for is emergency powers. Whereas the Constitution 
made no provision for such powers, its framers were heavily influ-
enced by John Locke, who made an exception in his social contract 
for the prerogative powers of the ruler. Locke argued that if, in times 
of emergency, the ruler found it necessary to pursue extralegal or ille-
gal actions, the subsequent reaction from the legislature and the peo-
ple would either vindicate or remove that ruler (Locke 1689). Locke’s 
prerogative power may have been left out of the US Constitution, but 
the efficiency and superior control one person has, as opposed to hun-
dreds, quickly became clear to the rulers of the new republic: Con-
gress was not in session all year, and as such was not amenable to dis-
patch. Perhaps that is what Henry Kissinger meant when he said that 
American government inherently centralizes power in the executive. 
Indeed, John Jay had already noted this in the Federalist Papers, No. 
64.  
 
According to former Bush administration official Jack Goldsmith, the 
philosophy of presidential prerogative can be seen in the decisions 
made by President Bush and Vice President Cheney. Whereas “many 
people think [Lincoln and FDR] broke the law” Goldsmith states, 
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“we’ve largely forgiven them for doing so because we think that they 
acted prudently in crisis” (Murphy and Purdum 2009: 12). Comparing 
Bush to Lincoln or F.D. R presents some problems, however. Where 
they coupled their sense of a powerful executive in times of crisis with 
a “powerful sense of a need to legitimate and justify the power 
through education, through legislation, through getting Congress on 
board, through paying attention to what one might call the ‘soft’ val-
ues of constitutionalism,” says Goldsmith, there seems to have been 
little appetite for such acts on the part of the Bush administration 
(ibid).  
 
What happens to executive power when the national security crisis 
becomes permanent? It is highly unlikely that the United States can 
eradicate the threat of future terrorist attacks. Does this mean that the 
current national security emergency is a permanent one? What presi-
dent, when presented with awesome powers and a diminished threat, 
will relinquish that power? Although history provides very few exam-
ples, there is the inspiring case of the first American president, George 
Washington. Not only did Washington immediately resign as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Continental Army upon victory in the Revolu-
tionary War, he was later to establish the tradition that US presidents 
serve only two terms, voluntarily relinquishing the chance at a third. 
(After Franklin D. Roosevelt violated this tradition by seeking election 
four times – in a time of war – Congress passed the twenty second 
amendment to the Constitution in 1947 making explicit the earlier tra-
dition.) President Obama’s political supporters rationalize that while 
executive powers in the war on terror have expanded during his ten-
ure, President Obama will prove to be a wise steward of these powers, 
ultimately representing an improvement on the Bush era. Sen. Carl 
Levin (D–Mich.), for instance, has insisted that the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2012 is not as bad as it sounds regarding indefi-
nite detention, because of Obama’s signing statement. In this state-
ment that accompanies the NDAA, the president states that he does 
not intend to use the latest power given to him by Congress to impris-
on terror suspects indefinitely. On the other hand, Obama might find 
that he has spoken too soon. And he certainly does not speak for his 
successor, whoever that might be. 
 
Before they were Americans, the framers of the US Constitution were 
British subjects, sensitive to the dangers of a powerful monarch. As 
James Madison warned, “If men were angels, no government would 
be necessary.” Signing statements as to the good intentions of the 
president is not enough. The laws themselves must be just and right, 
or else there will be no guarantees against abuses of power – particu-
larly not in times of national security crises. 
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Describing the research underlying this report to a former Bush ad-
ministration official who had worked in the State Department and on 
the National Security Council, I argued there were two likely explana-
tions why President Obama had come to find the powers of the Execu-
tive Branch more attractive than had Candidate Obama. First, the path 
dependency explanation: it is very hard to reverse previous admin-
istration’s policies and their calls for power, because of the new reali-
ties that such policies create. For instance, Obama’s difficulties in 
closing Guantánamo prison are real. The very establishment of these 
facilities created not just the only place where alien terror suspects 
could be held (because of Congressional resistance to their transferal 
to domestic prisons) – this move also created an entirely new group of 
people likely to remain the indefinite responsibility of the United 
States. Second, the personal explanation: Perhaps Obama – once pres-
ident – came to think that he would be able to wield the vast national 
security powers of the Chief Executive more wisely than his predeces-
sor had done, and could therefore be entrusted with the Bush legacy.  
 
Unsurprisingly, this former Bush administration official replied that 
there was a third explanation: That President Obama, once in office, 
found that the policies and accumulated power of Bush were the right 
answer to a difficult time, and for that reason he decided to follow 
through on the second Bush administration’s strategy. In short, then: 
Obama simply had a change of heart. 
 
Unless President Obama manages to achieves a more radical break 
with his predecessor than has been attempted so far, there would seem 
to be no reason to doubt this third explanation. 
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